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INTRODUCTION
On April 3, 2016, news broke that data leaked from the Panamanian
law firm Mossack Fonseca revealed that several world leaders had been
engaged in tax evasion, corruption, and money laundering.1 Within a few
days, a popular American publication claimed that the Panama Papers had
broken the internet because discussion on the trove of documents using the
hashtag #PanamaPapers was trending on social media platforms such as
Twitter, Facebook, and Reddit.2
A year later, the Mail & Guardian, a popular South African newspa-
per, noted that the hashtag #Guptaleaks and the term “state capture” had
gone viral on South African social media as the public reacted to allegations
of corruption involving then President Jacob Zuma and the influential
Gupta family.3
1. Steph Solis, #PanamaPapers Corruption Scandal Breaks the Internet, USA TODAY
(Apr. 29, 2016, 8:36 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/04/03/panama-pa-
pers-investigation-trending/82590686.
2. Id.
3. Why You Should Care About the #GuptaLeaks—an International View, MAIL & GUARD-
IAN (Aug. 9, 2017), https://mg.co.za/article/2017-08-09-why-you-should-care-about-the-
guptaleaks-an-international-view.
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The Panama Papers, the Gupta leaks, and similar large-scale corrup-
tion scandals of the past decade, which were unraveled by investigative
journalists and amplified by social media, sent shock waves around the
world. As more information was uncovered about allegedly improper deals
and transactions, companies and investors across the globe scrambled to
determine whether they were implicated in these scandals. Had they relied
on business partners now identified as improperly connected to government
officials to secure investment? What would be the resultant legal liability
risks for the investor in his or her home or host country?4 Was the govern-
ment official who had approved the investment in an emerging-market
country, or who was managing the investor-state relationship, now persona
non grata? And if so, what did that mean for the investment?
Companies cannot predict and plan for every potential challenge that
may affect their investments, particularly when doing business with a public
or state-owned entity. Companies investing in emerging markets must as-
sess a variety of factors that will condition the return on their investment,
and therefore set the go or no-go call on making such investments. The host
country’s level of corruption, strength of legal system, and political stability
all affect firms’ investment decisions. While emerging markets and devel-
oping economies can offer some of the best returns on corporate invest-
ment, they tend to be characterized by, or are often associated with, higher
levels of public corruption and political risk.5 The conflicts that result from
corruption in investor-state business relations often play out in public, are
challenging to resolve amicably, and can have ripple effects on investors
even outside the host country.
Reduced levels of corruption can have a positive effect on inflows of
foreign direct investments (FDIs), which can themselves increase national
resources and significantly contribute to economic development.6 On the
one hand, anticorruption exposés publicized by the media can increase
transparency and promote accountability for public officials and private ac-
tors involved in acts of bribery and corruption and other financial crimes.
On the other hand, sensational reporting or civil society anticorruption
movements that break along primarily political lines can increase investors’
risk aversion for economies in need of foreign investment, particularly in
asset- and resource-intensive sectors such as infrastructure projects. Encour-
aging investment remains key, and media coverage marked by a presump-
4. By host country, the author refers to the country receiving a foreign direct investment.
5. See Weiling Jiang et al., Political Risk Management of Foreign Direct Investment in
Infrastructure Projects: Bibliometric-Qualitative Analyses of Research in Developing Countries,
ENG’G, CONSTR. & ARCHITECTURAL MGMT. (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.researchgate.net/publi
cation/337969192_Political_risk_management_of_foreign_direct_investment_in_infrastructure_
projects_Bibliometric-qualitative_analyses_of_research_in_developing_countries.
6. See Reagan R. Demas, Moment of Truth: Development in Sub-Saharan Africa and Criti-
cal Alterations Needed in Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other Anti-Cor-
ruption Initiatives, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 315, 336–37 (2011).
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tion of guilt for foreign investors doing business with targeted
governments—even in the absence of established wrongdoing—does not
help achieve that goal. Nevertheless, modern anticorruption movements,
mobilizing social media tools that amplify the voice of civil society, may be
precisely what is needed to achieve accountability for corrupt officials and
investors who participate in corruption and to mitigate corruption’s sup-
pressing impact on investment.
To minimize both corruption and political risk at an early stage, invest-
ing companies usually engage in extensive due diligence of potential public
and state-owned business partners, craft contractual protections (e.g., audit
or termination rights, change-of-law, and alternative dispute resolution pro-
visions), design robust corporate compliance programs, or purchase politi-
cal-risk insurance. While these mitigants can increase an investor’s comfort
level, they cannot immunize a company from the collateral damage of pub-
lic corruption scandals, particularly when high-profile cases implicate a
counterparty.
For the past decade in particular, companies have had to account for,
and respond to, the impact of investigative journalism and social media
campaigns on their business.7 For companies trying to comply with an-
tibribery and anticorruption laws and regulations, it is difficult to anticipate
when and where the next corruption scandal—and the anticorruption
sweeps the scandal will prompt—will arise. It is also difficult to understand
how newly uncovered allegations of impropriety will affect the companies’
operations across the world.
First, this article identifies the rise of investigative journalism and so-
cial media as new tools for detecting bribery and corruption and raising
awareness about them. Second, it explains how these new tools can increase
the risk of investor-state conflict and enforcement against companies. Fi-
nally, it provides practical tips for companies to (i) anticipate and engage
alongside large-scale anticorruption initiatives in emerging markets
prompted by investigative journalism and (ii) manage the resulting conflict
that may arise in relation to business conducted with public or state-owned
counterparties tainted by corruption allegations.
PART I: THE ROLE OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN
THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
Mitigating risks related to corruption in emerging markets is a key
consideration for investors.8 This article argues that as companies strategize
7. See recent investigations of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists in-
cluding the 2020 “Luanda Leaks,” the 2019 “Mauritius Leaks” and “Bribery Division,” and the
2018 “West Africa Leaks.”
8. See, e.g., Lindsay B. Arrieta, Attacking Bribery at Its Core: Shifting Focus to the De-
mand Side of the Bribery Equation, 45 PUB. CONT. L.J., 587, 606 (2016) (“A study analyzing the
impact of foreign bribery laws on foreign investment illustrated that ‘laws against bribery abroad
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on how to manage business in these economies, they must account for the
increasingly important role that investigative journalism and social media
play in detecting and disseminating allegations of corruption and in raising
the likelihood of anticorruption enforcement by competent regulators.
These new forms of civic investigations tend to shape public opinion, and
they have created new compliance standards at times more stringent than
existing legal requirements.
A. The Rise of Media in Detecting Corruption and as a Catalyst of
Anticorruption Enforcement
Over the last two decades, free mass media, investigative journalism,
and anticorruption advocacy led by civil society have played an increas-
ingly important role in shaping domestic and cross-border efforts to root out
bribery and corruption. Sometimes referred to as the “fourth estate,” free
mass media can serve as an institution of checks and balances that monitors
public officials’ and corporations’ compliance with domestic and interna-
tional law.9
Cross-border fact-finding and advocacy efforts have provided concrete
examples of international cooperation leading to financial and economic
crime being brought to the attention of the public and regulators.10 For ex-
ample, anticorruption enforcers in the United States are attentive to media
alerts from host countries that may implicate regulated companies in the
United States, amplifying the impact of local allegations, which can quickly
have a global impact.11 In the United States and other jurisdictions, regula-
tors also increasingly rely on the social media posts and accounts of compa-
nies’ employees and affiliates during anticorruption investigations to assess
companies’ liability, no longer limiting the reach of their investigations to
traditional email review.12
In this article, we define the term “media” broadly to encompass both
traditional forms of reporting and new horizontal forms of information shar-
appear to be effective in making investors more sensitive to host country corruption, but only
when the laws are in place and coordinated in multiple countries.’” (quoting Alvaro Cuervo-
Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws Against Bribery Abroad, 39 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 634, 635
(2008))).
9. Christopher Starke et al., Free to Expose Corruption: The Impact of Media Freedom,
Internet Access, and Governmental Online Service Delivery on Corruption, 10 INT’L J.
COMMC’N 4702, 4703 (2016).
10. See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], The Role of the Media and Investigative
Journalism in Combating Terrorism (Abstract) (2018) [hereinafter OECD Report] (“International
consortiums of investigative journalists are an example of an international cooperation that leads
to tangible results in bringing financial and economic crime to the attention of the public and law
enforcement authorities.”). See, for example, platforms such as the Organised Crime and Corrup-
tion Reporting Project, the Global Investigative Journalism Network, or the International Consor-
tium of Investigative Journalists.
11. Client confidential matters.
12. Client confidential matters.
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ing through social media and networks. Merriam-Webster defines social
media as “forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social
networking and microblogging) through which users create online commu-
nities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content
(such as videos).”13 Social media also include globally popular messaging
applications such as Kik, WhatsApp, and Telegram, which make it possible
for information to spread quickly, even where populations are geographi-
cally, culturally, or politically distant.14 Further, we define corruption, in
accordance with the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),15 as giving,
offering, or promising anything of value to a government official in order to
obtain or retain an improper business advantage.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) has recognized that media reporting and investigative journalism
by affiliated and independent journalists and nongovernmental organiza-
tions are “an essential—albeit untapped—source of detection in corruption
cases” and are “among the most important sources of public awareness-
raising on corruption.”16 Today more than ever, open data has allowed in-
vestigative journalists to gain access to enormous volumes of information
and to process it through transnational networks of professionals, facilitat-
ing new forms of large-scale nongovernmental investigations.17 Findings of
such initiatives have raised awareness and democratized information about
both public and private corruption networks.
On April 3, 2016, the International Consortium of Investigative Jour-
nalists (ICIJ) released one of the largest information leaks in history, from
the law firm Mossack Fonseca, exposing the offshore holdings of 140 cur-
rent and former world leaders.18 The same day, more than one hundred
13. See Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/so-
cial%20media (last visited July 30, 2020); see also Lori McCay-Peet & Anabel Quan-Haase, A
Model of Social Media Engagement: User Profiles, Gratifications, and Experiences, THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MEDIA RESEARCH METHODS 6 (2016) (“Social media are web-based ser-
vices that allow individuals, communities, and organizations to collaborate, connect, interact, and
build community by enabling them to create, co-create, modifies, share, and engage with user-
generated content that is easily accessible.”); Caleb T. Carr & Rebecca A. Hayes, Social Media:
Defining, Developing, and Divining, ATL. J. OF COMMC’N 46, 50 (2015) (“Social media are In-
ternet-based channels that allow users to opportunistically interact and selectively self-present,
either in real-time or asynchronously, with both broad and narrow audiences who derive value
from user-generated content and the perception of interaction with others.”).
14. See generally Benedict Evans, WhatsApp—the Biggest Social Network You’ve Never
Heard Of, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2012, 5:09 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/benedictevans/2012/
10/19/whatsapp-the-biggest-social-network-youve-never-heard-of/#21bf365472eb.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
16. OECD Report, supra note 10, at 4 (“Media reporting in general, and especially investiga-
tive journalism by affiliated or independent journalists, or indeed non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), are among the most important sources of public awareness-raising on corruption.”).
17. Id.
18. A New ICIJ Investigation Exposes a Rogue Offshore Industry, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVES-
TIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2016), https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/new-
icij-investigation-exposes-rogue-offshore-industry.
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news organizations internationally shared the findings of this unprecedented
initiative.19 The investigation involved over 350 reporters from eighty
countries, who teased through approximately 11.5 million documents cov-
ering a forty-year period from the late 1970s through 2017.20 Among many
other secrets, the Panama Papers exposed the existence of offshore compa-
nies controlled by the then prime ministers of Iceland and Pakistan, the king
of Saudi Arabia, and the children of the president of Azerbaijan.21 ICIJ
described this project as “the largest cross-border media collaboration ever
undertaken,” involving journalists working in more than twenty-five
languages.22
Since 2016, the ICIJ has published results from other large-scale inves-
tigations into offshore activities, including the following:
• The Paradise Papers (2017): a global investigation into the off-
shore activities of more than 120 political and world leaders
and their financiers and the tax engineering of more than one
hundred multinational companies, based on a leak of 13.4 mil-
lion documents;23
• West Africa Leaks (2018): a regional investigation uncovering
secretive companies and bank accounts of West African politi-
cians and corporate executives, based on a leak of 27.5 million
documents;24
• Bribery Division (2019): a regional investigation using leaked
files from the Brazilian firm Odebrecht, exposing details of
prominent figures and public works projects embroiled in
Latin America’s cash-for-contracts scandal;25 and
• FinCEN Files (2020): a cross-border investigation in coopera-
tion with Buzzfeed News and other media partners into more
than 2,100 suspicious activity reports filed between 2000 and
2017 by global banks to the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN), the US Treasury Department’s intelli-
gence unit.26
19. Id.
20. Will Fitzgibbon, Panama Papers FAQ: All You Need to Know About the 2016 Investiga-
tion, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.icij.org/inves-
tigations/panama-papers/panama-papers-faq-all-you-need-to-know-about-the-2016-investigation.
21. A New ICIJ Investigation Exposes a Rogue Offshore Industry, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. Paradise Papers: Secrets of the Global Elite, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOUR-
NALISTS, https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/ (last visited July 14, 2020); see also
About the Paradise Papers Investigation, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Nov.
5, 2017), https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/about.
24. West Africa Leaks, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, https://
www.icij.org/investigations/west-africa-leaks (last visited July 14, 2020).
25. Bribery Division, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, https://www.icij.org/
investigations/bribery-division (last visited July 30, 2020).
26. Will Fitzgibbon et al., What Is the FinCEN Files Investigation?, INT’L CONSORTIUM IN-
VESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Sept. 20, 2020), https://www.icij.org/investigations/fincen-files/what-
is-the-fincen-files-investigation; Fergus Shiel & Ben Hallman, Suspicious Activity Reports, Ex-
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In June 2018, the ICIJ also published news stories from a new leak of
1.25 million files from Mossack Fonseca.27
Increased internet access and new technologies of information and
communication (TICs) have also enabled “civic technology movements” to
arise, some entirely dedicated to sustaining anticorruption efforts.28 These
grassroots, tech-savvy movements are often leaderless and nonhierarchi-
cal.29 The Nigerian civic organization BudgIT illustrates this trend.
Founded in 2011, BudgIT utilizes technological tools to simplify the budget
and matters of public spending for citizens, with the primary aim of raising
standards of transparency and accountability in government.30
Social media platforms are also proving to be instrumental for civil
society–led anticorruption initiatives, as illustrated by the experience of
Russian activist and blogger Alexei Navalny who was poisoned with a
nerve agent in August 2020.31 In 2008, the former anticorruption lawyer
started blogging about alleged malpractice and corruption at Russian state-
owned corporations and among senior government officials, leveraging so-
cial media to share his views.32 Navalny rapidly earned international recog-
nition for his advocacy. In 2010, he was awarded a Yale World Fellowship,
during which he shed light on corruption charges against the Russian oil
and gas company Transneft.33 Since then, Navalny has gained popular sup-
port, coordinating mass rallies gathering thousands of protesters denouncing
Russia’s public corruption apparatus. The anticorruption campaigner has
become a prominent opposition figure; he attempted to run for Russia’s
plained, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Sept. 20, 2020), https://www.icij.org/
investigations/fincen-files/suspicious-activity-reports-explained.
27. Amy Wilson-Chapman et al., What Happened After the Panama Papers, INT’L CONSOR-
TIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-pa-
pers/panama-papers-faq-all-you-need-to-know-about-the-2016-investigation.
28. Starke et al., supra note 9, at 4706.
29. Lovell Fernandez, A Survey of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Initiatives in Africa,
2 J. ANTI-CORRUPTION L. 31, 54 (2018).
30. See About Us, BUDGIT, https://yourbudgit.com/about-us/ (last visited July 14, 2020); see
also Fernandez, supra note 29, at 54.
31. See Michael Schwirtz, Aleksi Navalny, Russian Dissident, Says He Can Walk and Speak
Now, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/world/europe/navalny-
russian-dissident-recovery.html.
32. See Alexei Navalny: Russia’s Vociferous Putin Critic, BBC (Sept. 2, 2020), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16057045; Madeleine Roache, Why Does Alexei Navalny Rat-
tle the Kremlin?, AL JAZEERA (July 29, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/alexei-
navalny-rattle-kremlin-190730011624727.html; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, Following the
Money: Lessons from the Panama Papers, Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 PA. ST. L. REV. 807,
859–60 (2017) (citing Paul M. Healy & Karthik Ramanna, When the Crowd Fights Corruption, 91
HARV. BUS. REV. 1 (2013)).
33. See Alexey Navalny, Politician and Head of Anti-Corruption Foundation, YALE MAURICE
R. GREENBERG WORLD FELLOWS PROGRAM, https://worldfellows.yale.edu/person/alexey-navalny
(last visited Sept. 27, 2020); see also Michael Weiss, What the Aleksei Navalny Case Says About
Life in Putin’s Russia: How a LiveJournal Blogger Became the Russian President’s Worst Enemy,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/what-the-
aleksei-navalny-case-says-about-life-in-putins-russia/275175.
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presidency against Vladimir Putin in 2018, and he faced criminal prosecu-
tion denounced as politically motivated.34
Platforms exclusively dedicated to sharing information on corruption
have also emerged, such as the website IPaidABribe.com, created by
Janaagraha’s Centre for Citizenship and Democracy, where anonymous
users can report on the nature, number, pattern, types, location, frequency,
and values of actual bribes they have paid or resisted.35
Investigative journalism and social media advocacy have shaped a new
wave of anticorruption prosecution and oriented cross-border enforcement
efforts. While the media have no formal enforcement powers to sanction
public officials, they function as a watchdog, holding public figures ac-
countable, particularly political leaders who derive their legitimacy from
democratic approval.36
The release of the Panama Papers, for example, prompted an almost
immediate coordination of global enforcement efforts. On April 16, 2016,
less than two weeks following the release of the first wave of findings, the
Guardian reported that tax investigators from twenty-eight countries gath-
ered in Paris, France, to launch an unprecedented international inquiry.37
The ICIJ has reported that at least eighty-two countries have launched in-
vestigations in connection with this release.38
Furthermore, the release of the papers had immediate repercussions for
elected officials of several countries. The day following the release of the
Panama Papers, thousands of protesters gathered in front of Iceland’s par-
liament, throwing yogurt, bananas, and eggs while calling for the resigna-
tion of Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson. Two days after the
investigation’s release, Minister Gunnlaugsson announced that he would
step down.39 Similarly, a few days after the release of the papers, allega-
tions of misconduct arose against Clive Khulubuse Zuma—the nephew of
former South African President Jacob Zuma—in connection with his busi-
ness dealings in the oil industry of the Democratic Republic of Congo,
34. Roache, supra note 32.
35. See Trautman, supra note 32, at 861; see also Stephanie Storm, Web Sites Shine Light on
Petty Bribery Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/busi-
ness/web-sites-shine-light-on-petty-bribery-worldwide.html.
36. See Nils Köbis & Christopher Starke, Why Did the Panama Papers (Not) Shatter the
World? The Relationship Between Journalism and Corruption, INTERDISC. CORRUPTION RSCH.
NETWORK 69, 71–72 (2017).
37. See Trautman, supra note 32, at 839 (citing Holly Watt, Panama Papers: Global Tax
Officials to Launch Unprecedented Inquiry, GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2016), https://
www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/12/panama-papers-global-tax-officials-inquiry-paris-
meeting.
38. Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, What Happened with the Panama Papers,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O6pJblCF8t4.
39. Id. See also Will Fitzgibbon, The Panama Papers Revisited: Yogurt, Bananas, Small
Moustaches, and Fonts, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2018), https://
www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/panama-papers-revisited-yogurt-bananas-small-mous-
taches-fonts.
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where South Africa had sent peacekeepers. The accusations inflamed public
opinion and contributed to the precipitation of impeachment proceedings
over allegations that he misappropriated public funds.40 The investigation
also shed light on the offshore holdings of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif, which prompted the Supreme Court of Pakistan to open a corruption
probe into Sharif and two of his children.41
While they are powerful tools in the modern fight against corruption,
investigative journalism and new media advocacy can also have negative
side effects and generate collateral damage. They can lead the public to
condemn investors that have not engaged in illegal activities simply be-
cause they did business with a regime later denounced by civil society as
“corrupt.” Investors who do business with regimes later tainted by corrup-
tion scandals can be viewed ipso facto as complicit in corruption, even ab-
sent factual evidence. Broad-brush advocacy campaigns, while effective at
holding those who work with corrupt regimes accountable, can cause even
compliance-minded investors to rethink potential investments in emerging
markets for fear that the regimes in those countries may later be exposed as
corrupt and the investor could be viewed as part of a large-scale public
corruption scheme merely based on an investment. Any effects of civil soci-
ety movements that discourage investors with high compliance IQ from in-
vesting in emerging markets should be minimized.
B. The Impact of Media and Anticorruption Investigations on Corporate
Image and Legitimacy
Anticorruption investigations and advocacy led by civil society and
social media also influence the public’s opinion on certain corporate prac-
tices, forcing companies to review their procedures in order to be seen in a
positive light and to avoid being swept into corruption scandals either as
active participants, unknowing beneficiaries, or innocent collateral dam-
age.42 Media coverage shapes public opinion and affects corporate image.43
More importantly, media can give or deny legitimacy to corporate actors.
As several commentators have argued, “Legitimacy theory posits that in
order for companies to continue their business operations, their values must
40. See Trautman, supra note 32, at 821–22.
41. The ICIJ reported that Sharif’s daughter submitted a document to the court that claimed
she was not the owner of an offshore company under scrutiny, leading to online ridicule of the
proffered evidence under the hashtag #fontgate. See Fitzgibbon, supra note 39.
42. Today’s social media tools are channels that allow civil society to collectively express
itself with much more force and vigor. Whereas historically a news outlet might attempt to run a
story that might not be widely read or be squashed by officials or a concerned editor, social
media–fueled movements are unimpeded by such guardrails or gatekeepers.
43. Muhammad Azizul Islam et al., Anti-bribery Disclosures: A Response to Networked Gov-
ernance, 42 ACCOUNTING FORUM 3, 4 (2018) (“Prior research suggests that media coverage influ-
ences public opinion and public policy development. Similarly, in business, the media in its
variety of forms (business press, web and visual medium) has a marked influence on establishing
and influencing the corporate image, agenda and practices.” (internal citations omitted)).
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remain congruent with the value system of the society.”44 To be viewed as
legitimate economic actors, investors need to maintain support from various
stakeholders, including their own employees, shareholders, and members of
the communities in which they operate. To maintain this support, investors’
activities must be consistent with stakeholder values.45 Corruption scandals
thus create legitimacy threats.46
The challenge for corporate actors is to keep up with the different val-
ues of various stakeholders. Stakeholder reactions to corruption allegations
released on social media can be swift, inflamed by inaccurate perceptions,
and clouded by political biases. Reactions can conflate criminal activity
with legal activity. Social media– and civil society–led movements are im-
portant new weapons in the corruption fight, but they often are blunt an-
ticorruption instruments that are ill-equipped to navigate the subtleties of
the law, discern motives, or draw nuanced distinctions where “gray area”
exists.
For investors in emerging markets, the challenge of aligning with
stakeholder values is often most acute in the selection of business partners.
While certain business partners might have passed muster at the time of
contract formation and may not have raised compliance concerns in the
course of due diligence, allegations can later arise regarding the legitimacy
of these partners and their connections to government officials.
In South Africa, for example, following a series of scandals, the sur-
name “Gupta” became a household name associated with corruption of pub-
lic officials. Among other things, the Gupta family is alleged to have set up
a series of intermediary companies to serve partner roles with multinational
companies seeking business in South Africa. A November 2016 report on
“state capture” describes the Guptas’ ties to former President Jacob Zuma
and other officials, and alleges that the Guptas were involved in improper
awarding of state contracts to entities affiliated with the family.47 The situa-
tion escalated after emails were leaked from a Gupta server, and the media
have relied on the so-called #GuptaLeaks to expose corruption in South
Africa and demand change.48
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id. (“When corporate activities are inconsistent with community expectations, a legiti-
macy threat arises. Legitimacy theory provides the theoretical lens to examine the interaction
between companies’ reporting media and its physical and social environment.” (citation omitted)).
46. Id. (“When a corporation is publicly linked to a major incident with negative social or
environmental implications, a legitimacy threat arises and corporate executives respond via differ-
ent communication strategies to inform the public of the organisation’s legitimacy seeking activi-
ties.” (internal citation omitted)).
47. PUBLIC PROTECTOR SOUTH AFRICA, REPORT NO. 6 OF 2016/17, STATE OF CAPTURE 29–30
(2016).
48. See Ed Cropley et al., FBI Opens Investigation into South Africa’s Guptas, REUTERS
(Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-politics/fbi-opens-investigation-into-
south-africas-guptas-ft-idUSKBN1CO0R1; Norimitsu Onishi & Selam Gebrekidan, In Gupta
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Association with the Guptas quickly became one of the fastest ways
for a private actor to lose legitimacy. As the extent of the Gupta empire and
the names of companies affiliated with the family were gradually uncov-
ered, it became clear that the Guptas had interests in a range of industries,
including mining, media, and technology.49 The site Guptaleaks.com main-
tained a list of companies affiliated with the Guptas. Media articles would
routinely disclose the names of new entities found to have ties to the
family.50
This meant that investors had to explain, in light of the South African
state-capture scandal, why they had done business with these entities, even
where, at the time of the relevant transactions, public records might not
have indicated that the entities were affiliated with the Guptas or that the
Guptas were engaged in misconduct. The movement even expanded to
question foreign investors who had no link to the Guptas but who had finan-
cially benefited from business conducted with South African state-owned
entities. These questions were based on the perception and civil society de-
termination that the Zuma regime and Zuma’s “cronies” running state enter-
prises were corrupt, which thereby created a presumption of guilt for any
investor who financially benefited.51
Having to prove compliance post scandal is all the more challenging
because investors have limited tools to evaluate the risk of corruption prior
to the publication of an enforcement action or the sharing of leaks. Effec-
tively measuring and comparing national levels of corruption in advance of
an investment presents methodological difficulties. Companies often rely on
corruption indexes measuring levels of perceived corruption rather than ac-
tual or real-time corruption. Such indicators tend to aggregate data from
qualitative field research and can reinforce existing perception biases,
which is especially damaging for emerging and developing economies look-
Brothers’ Rise and Fall, the Tale of a Sullied A.N.C., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/12/22/world/africa/gupta-zuma-south-africa-corruption.html.
49. Jaclyn Jaeger, South Africa Gupta Saga: A Long List of Compliance Failures, COMPLI-
ANCE WEEK (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.complianceweek.com/south-africa-gupta-saga-a-long-
list-of-compliance-failures/2471.article (“At the center of it all is South Africa’s Gupta family,
who gained notoriety after whistleblower accusations surfaced that the Gupta’s family empire—
with business interests in computers, technology, mining, air travel, energy, and media—for years
has been using their close, personal ties with President Jacob Zuma to control state business.”).
50. See, e.g., Amil Umraw, FBI to Probe Guptas’ U.S. Links, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 19,
2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2017/10/19/fbi-to-probe-guptas-u-s-links_a_23248444
(discussing links between the Guptas and Texas-based company Brookfield Consultants); Franz
Wild, KPMG Watched as Guptas Moved South Africa Public Funds for Wedding, BLOOMBERG
(June 30, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-30/kpmg-watched-as-guptas-
moved-s-africa-public-funds-for-wedding (mentioning links between the Guptas and a number of
entities, including Accurate Investments Ltd., Linkway Trading, and Estina Dairy Farm).
51. TimesLive, How Zuma Is Still Hurting SA, SUNDAY TIMES (Mar. 31, 2018), https://
www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-03-30-how-zuma-is-still-hurting-sa.
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ing to shed stereotypical conceptions that can have long-lasting negative
consequences.52
Investors in emerging markets can be caught in the crossfire following
widely disseminated allegations of misconduct by public officials. Investors
who dealt with disgraced government officials can be presumptively viewed
as having participated in, or been aware of, any misconduct. Further, ac-
tions by investors that do not constitute violations of law can nonetheless be
seen as improper by the public in the wake of a corruption scandal. Another
risk for investors is that these corruption campaigns raise the risk of prose-
cution or investigation, even for those companies who are unfairly associ-
ated with wrongdoing.
PART II: HOW THE MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS HAVE
INCREASED THE RISK OF ANTICORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT BY
HOST AND HOME STATES
The rise in anticorruption investigative journalism and social media
advocacy correlates with the rise of large global settlements involving mul-
tinational companies charged by regulators with paying government offi-
cials bribes. These large settlements have shed light on the fact that
enforcement of laws prohibiting investor and corporate corruption is largely
left to a handful of countries, which often are not the countries whose offi-
cials have accepted bribes.
Social media and investigative journalism have thus risen to promi-
nence in the fight against corruption in part because they give a voice to
frustration regarding the gap left in corruption enforcement by “naming and
shaming” bad actors with political capital, thus raising awareness on the
demand side of corruption (i.e. when public officials solicit the payment of
bribes by private actors). These tools put pressure on governments to en-
force their anticorruption laws. The problem, however, is that governments
eager to gain legitimacy following massive leaks can then engage in large
anticorruption sweeps that affect the investments of both legitimate inves-
tors and persons engaging in misconduct.
52. Indeed, research has shown that there can be significant discrepancies between the man-
ner in which indicators and indices measure corruption in a country and the actual corruption in
the country. Some have argued that cultural, political, and economic biases impact corruption
perception, believing that factors such as “economic development, democratic institutions or Prot-
estant traditions[ ] systematically bias corruption perception indices downward from corruption
experience.” See Dilyan Donchev & Gergely Ujhelyi, What Do Corruption Indices Measure?, 26
ECON. & POL. 309, 309 (2014), https://uh.edu/~gujhelyi/corrmeasures.pdf. Other research argues
that corruption rankings are often misinterpreted as measuring a country’s actual performance
though they do not adequately capture year-to-year change in the country’s attitude toward corrup-
tion. See Debora Valentina Malito, Eur. Univ. Inst., Measuring Corruption Indicators and Indices,
at 18, Working Paper RSCAS 2014/13 (2014), https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/
29872/RSCAS_2014_13.pdf.
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A. The Supply Side Focus of Most Anticorruption Enforcement Efforts
Over the last two decades, the extraterritorial enforcement of an-
tibribery and anticorruption legislation has drastically increased, exposing
large-scale corruption schemes and forcing multinational companies to
enter into large settlement agreements with regulators. Such extraterritorial
enforcement efforts have historically been led by US regulators through the
prosecution of FCPA violations, although prosecutions by other countries
have grown substantially over the past decade.53 More jurisdictions have
since adopted and begun enforcing similar antibribery and anticorruption
legislation, and cooperation between regulators across jurisdictions (sharing
information and launching joint prosecutions) has become increasingly
important.54
The largest global antibribery and anticorruption settlements reached
to date resulted from enforcement actions launched by US, European, and
Brazilian regulators. For example, in January 2020, the US Department of
Justice (DOJ) announced it had entered into the “largest global foreign brib-
ery resolution to date” with the French aviation company Airbus SE.55 The
company agreed to pay combined penalties of more than $3.9 billion to
settle foreign bribery charges (among others) with the French, UK, and US
authorities. The charges arose in connection with the company’s use of
third-party intermediaries to bribe foreign government officials to obtain
improper business advantages from 2008 to 2015. Similarly, in 2016, Brazil
construction giant Odebrecht S.A. and its petrochemical unit, Braskem
S.A., agreed to pay $3.5 billion for a global settlement with authorities in
the United States, Brazil, and Switzerland for failing to disclose acts of
bribery and cover-ups investigated as part of Brazil’s Operation Car
53. Enforcement of Anti-Bribery & Anti-Corruption Legislation Globally (2005–2015) In-
fographic, THOMSON REUTERS, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/infographics/enforce
ment-anti-bribery-anti-corruption-legislation-globally.
54. Rachel Brewster & Christine Dryden, Building Multilateral Anticorruption Enforcement:
Analogies Between International Trade & Anti-Bribery Law, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 221, 254 (2018)
(discussing examples of cooperation by authorities in Germany, the U.K., and France with U.S.
authorities and arguing that “some OECD governments are already increasing their domestic en-
forcement of foreign bribery law to compete with American prosecutors.”); see also Helen Chan,
INSIGHT: Regulators Launch International Crackdown on Corruption, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-corruption-crackdown/insight-regulators-launch-inter-
national-crackdown-on-corruption-idUSKCN1LQ2JL (“A drive to crack down on corruption is
taking the business world by storm, as more jurisdictions adopt new anti-bribery regimes or step
up enforcement of existing ones. As countries with established regulatory regimes remain active
in enforcement, other countries plagued with bribery problems are undertaking determined efforts
to change their reputations.”)
55. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Airbus Agrees to Pay over $3.9 Billion in Global
Penalties to Resolve Foreign Bribery and ITAR Case (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/airbus-agrees-pay-over-39-billion-global-penalties-resolve-foreign-bribery-and-itar-case.
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Wash—a long-running probe by Brazilian prosecutors into the state-owned
energy company Petrobras.56
With the exception of Brazil, the vast majority of large anticorruption
settlements reached over the last decade did not stem from enforcement
actions launched by the host country and did not lead to prosecution of
public officials or recovery for the countries where the misconduct oc-
curred. This is because laws such as the FCPA target companies or individ-
uals that pay bribes, meaning that they focus on the supply side of the
bribery transaction.57 But a bribery transaction involves not only supply-
side participants, such as investors paying bribes, but also demand-side par-
ticipants, such as the public officials who demand or receive bribes.58
The large global anticorruption settlements of the past decade highlight
the gap between enforcement targeting bribery demand (recipients of brib-
ery, also known as passive bribery) and enforcement targeting the supply
side (givers of bribes, or active bribery).
B. Increased Pressure for Demand-Side Enforcement by Host States
Over the past decade there has been increased criticism of the current
global system of anticorruption enforcement as being overly focused on the
supply side of bribery and not sufficiently focused on the injury to those
most affected by corruption.59 One article has argued that
56. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Odebrecht and Braskem Plead Guilty and Agree to
Pay at Least $3.5 Billion in Global Penalties to Resolve Largest Foreign Bribery Case in History
(Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskem-plead-guilty-and-agree-
pay-least-35-billion-global-penalties-resolve.
57. Thomas Firestone & Maria Piontkovska, Two to Tango: Attacking the Demand Side of
Bribery, AM. INT. (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/12/17/two-to-
tango-attacking-the-demand-side-of-bribery (“[B]ribe demands remain a significant problem for
many honest companies. Unfortunately, the FCPA, which has proven to be such a valuable tool in
combatting corruption, only criminalizes the giving or offering of bribes, not demanding or receiv-
ing them. This omission makes it difficult for U.S. authorities to prosecute the foreign kleptocrats
who drive so much international corruption, and places U.S. law at odds with the international
standards that the United States has itself partly spawned.”).
58. Arrieta, supra note 8, at 590 (“Demand-side bribery (passive bribery) applies to those
individuals—often public officials or government employees—who solicit or accept the prohib-
ited payments. A bribe may be required or demanded to execute a public function, to expedite a
business transaction requiring government authorization (e.g., approving a license), or to grant an
advantage (e.g., awarding a government contract).”).
59. Firestone & Piontkovska, supra note 57 (citing Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD],
Foreign Bribery Enforcement: What Happens to the Public Officials on the Receiving End?
(2018), https://www.oecd.org/corruption/Foreign-Bribery-Enforcement-What-Happens-to-the-
Public-Officials-on-the-Receiving-End.pdf) (“While it is impossible to know who initiates most
bribe situations, the giver or the receiver, one thing is clear: No bribe can take place without both.
As the OECD has noted, ‘To have a globally effective overall enforcement system, both the sup-
ply-side participants (i.e., the bribers) and the demand-side participants (i.e., the public officials)
of bribery transactions must face genuine risks of prosecution and sanctions.’ It is for this reason
that international anti-corruption conventions frequently encourage state parties to address both
sides of bribery through their national legislation.”).
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[s]upply-side foreign bribery laws are not designed to benefit the
countries where the bribes are taking place—they are designed to
punish the act of paying a bribe. Thus, the harm inflicted on the
host country, where the bribe occurs, is not remedied by this stat-
utory mechanism. Proceeds or disgorgements obtained through
enforcement proceedings are rarely shared with the host country,
either because there is no formal sharing agreement in place or
due to concern that the host country may have been complicit in
the corrupt activity.60
In other words, the increase in large anticorruption prosecutions pun-
ishing the supply side of bribery has not been matched by an increase in
prosecution of allegedly corrupt public officials.61 This is because the pros-
ecution of public officials involved in schemes is often left to the host coun-
try. However, where impediments to rule of law exist, these prosecutions
are rare.62 The dearth of enforcement at the host-country level has resulted
in a movement led by nongovernmental organizations, civil society, and
media to detect corruption and expose misconduct in the public and private
sector and to put pressure on local governments to take action. Social media
and investigative journalism have thus become tools to pressure host-coun-
try governments to confront the demand side of bribery.63
Once governments are under pressure to address corruption, they often
engage in anticorruption enforcement activity to retain legitimacy. In July
2014, for instance, the Chinese government launched Operation Fox Hunt,
“a cross-border law enforcement operation in pursuit of corrupt Chinese
officials who had fled China, allegedly taking with them billions of dollars
in public funds.”64 Commentators have generally argued that Operation Fox
Hunt, in addition to addressing corruption, served as a tool to address criti-
cism of the ruling party. As one noted, “China’s Communist Party appears
to be using such anti-corruption initiatives to confront the party’s credibility
60. Arrieta, supra note 8, at 602 (internal citations omitted).
61. Id. (“[T]he accountability mechanisms on each side of the bribery transaction are not
distributed proportionately.”).
62. Lucinda A. Low et al., The ‘Demand Side’ of Transnational Bribery and Corruption:
Why Leveling the Playing Field on the Supply Side Isn’t Enough, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 580
(2015) (“Under the current system, the prosecution of the solicitation or acceptance of a bribe by a
public official of a particular country is left to that country, except in the unusual cases where
movement of the proceeds of the bribery to another country enables that country to prosecute the
individual using other legal tools.”).
63. Islam, supra note 43, at 5 (“The media also has a role in checking the supply of bribery
by naming and shaming transgressors when they report incidents of social contraventions (e.g.
bribery). According to Stapenhurst (2000, p. 4) ‘mere inquiries by reporters about apparent
wrongdoing can elicit pre-emptive responses by authorities eager to protect public image on their
institutions before any allegations have been aired.’”); see also Gavin du Venage, Social Media
Shines a Light on Corruption in Africa, NATIONAL (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.thenational.ae/
business/technology/social-media-shines-a-light-on-corruption-in-africa-1.775929 (reporting on
the use of social media by activists in Africa and arguing that it has led to greater public aware-
ness and outrage over stolen money, which in turn is driving leaders to fight corruption).
64. Arrieta, supra note 8, at 597.
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and legitimacy crisis. Fears of losing control and social instability, along
with economic concerns, likely motivated this movement.”65
Often an incoming government or administration will also feel pres-
sure to gain credibility by engaging in anticorruption enforcement as a
means of distancing itself from its predecessors. In Angola, public outrage
quickly grew following the Luanda Leaks, the release of a trove of docu-
ments by the ICIJ in January 2020 that revealed allegedly improper dealings
involving Isabel Dos Santos, Africa’s richest woman and daughter of the
former president.66 Within days, Angolan authorities announced a corrup-
tion probe and stated that Dos Santos was among a handful of formal sus-
pects.67 The announcement marked a clear rift between the Dos Santos
family and the current president. The current president, while having been
selected as a successor by Dos Santos’s father, has made it a point since
coming into power in 2017 to distance himself from his predecessor and be
seen as engaging in anticorruption efforts.68
Social media play a critical role in bypassing traditional channels
through which information is shared and amplified—channels that can
more easily be manipulated by repressive regimes, well-connected corrupt
officials, and well-placed cronies of those officials. Advocacy movements
utilizing social media take on a life of their own, often uncontrolled by the
subjects of the movement’s wrath or those who launch the movements.
These movements challenge the traditional protective mechanisms to con-
trol public messaging and reporting that corrupt officials relied upon histor-
ically; the movements also pose risks to investors doing business with
emerging-market governments. Investors must recognize and mitigate the
new risk of enforcement by host countries while recognizing the preexisting
and growing risk of enforcement by home states.
PART III: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MITIGATING AND MANAGING
INVESTOR-STATE CONFLICTS IN A NEW ERA OF CORRUPTION
RISK AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Allegations of corruption may prompt a public or state-owned entity to
review its contract with a foreign investor. The host country may also
launch an investigation into the activities of the investor or require the in-
vestor to provide documents or information to support an investigation into
65. Id. at 598.
66. Isabel dos Santos: Africa’s Richest Woman Accused of Fraud, BBC (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51218501.
67. Colin Dwyer, Africa’s Richest Woman Now Formally a Suspect in Angolan Corruption,
NPR (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/23/798865636/africas-richest-woman-now-for-
mally-a-suspect-in-angolan-corruption-probe.
68. Andrew Harding, Angola’s João Lourenço—the Man Taking on Isabel Dos Santos, BBC
(Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51221737; David Pilling, Africa: Can
João Lourenço Cure Angola of Its Crony Capitalism?, FIN. TIMES (July 8, 2019), https://
www.ft.com/content/9ccc1df0-9f0d-11e9-9c06-a4640c9feebb.
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the conduct of government officials. Association in the media between al-
leged corrupt conduct and a foreign investor may result in reputational harm
and may also attract the attention of regulators in other parts of the world,
who may begin parallel proceedings against the entity. To mitigate in-
creased risks of enforcement prompted by the work of investigative journal-
ists or social media campaigns, investors in emerging markets must take
steps to vet opportunities and perform due diligence in advance, prevent
misconduct in the first place, manage corruption-related disputes with the
host state, and develop an exit strategy.
This section outlines best practices for companies investing in emerg-
ing markets and partnering with public or state-owned entities to manage
the risk of conflict and liability raised by new forms of anticorruption cam-
paigns in host countries. It first discusses the design and implementation of
an effective compliance program, including recommended steps for identi-
fying and managing local business partners who pose the most significant
anticorruption risk in investor-state relationships, as well as best practices
for managing the relationship with a state-owned entity or other public
counterpart to avoid corruption-related conflict. The section then provides
advice for managing enforcement actions that may arise in the wake of a
highly publicized corruption scandal. Additionally, it discusses the impor-
tance of exit strategies for investors in emerging markets. Finally, this sec-
tion provides recommendations on how investors can prepare for the impact
of corruption-related disputes with host states on enforcement actions in
other jurisdictions.
A. The Need for Investors to Develop and Implement Effective
Compliance Programs
Investors in high-risk jurisdictions should approach investment in
emerging markets with a plan in place to thwart misconduct. That is the
critical function of an investor’s compliance program. An effective compli-
ance program enables companies to prevent, detect, and address compliance
risks, therefore limiting the risk that investors are affected by corruption
scandals in a host country. Further, regulators around the world expect com-
panies to put in place processes and procedures to prevent corruption and
often take into account the implementation of such programs in enforce-
ment decisions. The US Sentencing Guidelines, the guidance to the UK
Bribery Act, the guidelines for compliance programs under Brazil’s Clean
Company Act, France’s Law on Transparency, the Good Practice Guidance
by the OECD, the US DOJ’s compliance program evaluation guidance, and
the US Department of Treasury’s Framework for OFAC Compliance Com-
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mitments all outline expectations regarding corporate compliance
programs.69
A robust corporate compliance program should be structured around
five essential elements: (1) leadership, (2) risk assessment, (3) standards
and controls, (4) training and communication, and (5) oversight.70 Recom-
mendations for investors regarding each of these elements are detailed
below.
1. Leadership
An investing company’s senior management must make the com-
pany’s commitment to compliance clear to all stakeholders, including per-
sonnel, agents, and public officials in the host country. When companies
invest in emerging markets, this tone from the top is all the more important
to avoid the impression that the rules or standards are different in the host
market, or that employees can engage in whatever they perceive the local
practice to be in terms of engagement with public officials. Behavior of
political figures and investor leaders that is out of line with stakeholders’
compliance expectations, when publicized on social media, can exacerbate
growing frustration and anger toward those seen as improperly benefiting
from the country’s wealth.71
69. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B4.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018); MINIS-
TRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE ON PROCEDURES WHICH RELEVANT COMMER-
CIAL ORGANISATIONS CAN PUT INTO PLACE TO PREVENT PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM FROM
BRIBING (SECTION 9 OF THE BRIBERY ACT), 2011 (U.K.), https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/
legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf; Lei No. L12846 [Clean Company Act], de 1 de Agosto
de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U], Agosto 2013 (Braz.), http://www.planalto.gov.br/
ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2013/lei/l12846.html; Loi 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 [Sapin II],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], Dec. 10, 2016 (Fr.); Org. for Econ.
Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance
(Feb. 18, 2010), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44884389.pdf; CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (June 2020); OFF. OF FOREIGN AS-
SETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, A FRAMEWORK FOR OFAC COMPLIANCE COMMIT-
MENTS (2019).
70. Baker & McKenzie, 5 Essential Elements of Compliance (2012), https://www.bakermc-
kenzie.com/~/media/Files/BDSUploads/Documents/global%20corporate%20compliance/br_com
pliance_fiveessentialelements_12.pdf.
71. For instance, leaked videos of Karim Keita, son of Malian president Ibrahim Boubacar
Keita, at a party on a luxury yacht were widely circulated on social media and contributed to anger
expressed during antigovernment protests, eventually leading to Karim Keita’s resignation on
July 13, 2020, from his position as chair of the parliament’s defense committee. See News Wires,
Embattled Mali President’s Son Quits Role in Parliament amid Protests, FRANCE24 (July 13,
2020), https://www.france24.com/en/20200713-mali-frees-detained-opposition-figures-on-fourth-
day-of-unrest-in-capital-bamako. President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was eventually ousted via a
coup in August 2020, following months of protests. See Ruth Maclean, Mali’s President Exits
After Being Arrested in Military Coup, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/08/18/world/africa/mali-mutiny-coup.html.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST206.txt unknown Seq: 20  3-JUN-21 12:34
334 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2
2. Risk Assessment
Investors should thoroughly assess compliance risks both at the time of
their investment decision and on a periodic basis thereafter.72 Enforcement
authorities expect companies to evaluate business risks by region, transac-
tion, and industry before making the decision to invest in a host country.
Risk assessment allows investors to structure their investments to best miti-
gate corruption risk.
In addition, once allegations of corruption arise in the host country that
affect the investor’s industry, state-owned entities with whom the investor
does business, or officials in a position to improperly influence the inves-
tor’s business, investors should consider conducting a practical risk-based
compliance assessment of their operations to ensure that their dealings are
not tainted by any alleged misconduct.
3. Standards and Protocols
Both enforcement authorities and civil society expect that companies
investing in emerging markets will have policies in place that prohibit cor-
ruption. However, a code of conduct alone does not meet the heightened
compliance expectations of the past decade. In addition to written policies,
investors need to have protocols to implement concrete action.
Of utmost importance, a company investing in a high-risk jurisdiction
must have protocols for vetting the entities with which it deals as part of its
standards and controls. Corrupt transactions often involve third parties
(agents, consultants, joint venture partners, etc.) who act as a liaison be-
tween the giver and the receiver of a bribe.73 The investor needs to engage
in a thorough due diligence review of business partners and, in certain cir-
cumstances, customers. Given the potentially significant damage to a com-
pany’s reputation by association, companies should screen their business-
partner and customer lists for organizations that have been implicated in
recent corruption scandals, and they should scrutinize indirect beneficiaries.
Further, companies should thoroughly map a customer’s or partner’s con-
nections to political parties and public figures and take appropriate steps to
mitigate identified risks.74
For all third parties, companies should be able to document how the
business partner was selected, demonstrate a clear business justification for
hiring the partner, confirm bona fide tasks performed commensurate with
compensation, and establish that all applicable controls and procedures
were properly followed. These processes will help an investor respond to
any claims that partners were selected because of their connections to gov-
72. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S.
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, SECOND EDITION 59, 62, 66 (July 2020).
73. Id. at 22–23.
74. Id. at 63.
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ernment officials or to facilitate illegal activities by corrupt officials. An-
other standard practice should be to incorporate in agreements with third
parties, agents, or business partners clauses granting the investor audit
rights and requiring the partner to disclose allegations or problems and to
cooperate in any corruption investigation by the investor.
Standards and protocols in the context of a contractual relationship
with a state-owned or public entity should include protocols for regular en-
gagement with the host country. The investor and the state should agree in
the contract to engage in frequent performance reviews. These reviews en-
able the investor to create a record that it has complied with its contractual
obligations. Allegations of corruption are often bolstered by claims that the
foreign party did not perform or provided poor services, and that bribery of
officials enabled performance issues to go unchecked.
Frequent performance reviews also serve to create a framework and
periodicity to manage conflict amicably. Regular meetings enable the par-
ties to quickly identify concerns regarding a party’s ability to report pro-
gress, allow each side to understand the pressures and deadlines that the
counterparty faces (such as a state-owned entity’s need to provide internal
reports), and permit the parties to test various solutions to issues that arise.
Frequent and transparent touchpoints serve to build trust with an in-
coming administration. As noted above, a new administration may be suspi-
cious of deals entered into by predecessors, particularly when those
predecessors have been the subject of corruption allegations. Accordingly,
it is important for the investor to be able to quickly demonstrate that it has
complied, and intends to maintain compliance, with relevant laws and the
terms of any agreement. Transparent meetings with a new administration
will also serve to educate the government partner on the project, its current
status, and ongoing challenges. Additionally, the meetings may serve to
clear up any misinformation. The investor should take the opportunity to
provide an overview of compliance policies and procedures for the project
and take note of any new policy orientations that could affect the business
relationship.
4. Training and Communication
Investors should prepare to conduct regular training for officers, em-
ployees, and third parties on compliance expectations, the company’s code
of conduct, and applicable anticorruption laws. Additionally, as noted
above, an investor should regularly communicate with government counter-
parts regarding the investor’s policies and obligations (e.g., reminding the
government counterparts that the investor is subject to the FCPA).
Training should be customized by region, country, industry, area of
compliance, and audience. For example, there should be more frequent
trainings for employees that regularly interact with government officials. In
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higher-risk situations, live training should be encouraged as opposed to
webinars or online training. Employees and third parties should have access
to training in a language that they understand, and the training should pro-
vide recommendations on how to address cultural practices relevant to the
market (e.g., cultural expectations around gift giving, public procurement,
or hospitality).75
5. Oversight
Companies should also engage in appropriate ongoing monitoring of
their projects or operations in the host country. This may require conducting
regular audits and setting up a compliance hotline that employees, agents,
and business partners can use to anonymously report compliance
concerns.76
Investors should also confirm full compliance with local content regu-
lations.77 In many emerging markets, foreign investors are increasingly re-
quired to partner with a local entity to do business in the host country or to
obtain government contracts.78 Local content regulations vary from one
country to the next, but often put investors in the position of needing to
partner with politically well-connected individuals or parties who will add
minimal value to a project, elevating corruption risk.79 Yet, noncompliance
with local content laws can lead to criticism that a foreign investor is not
complying with its obligations, which can eventually lead to a dispute with
the host state. Foreign investors should devote adequate resources to ensur-
ing that they understand the local legal framework and can meaningfully
75. Id. at 32, 34, 60.
76. Kobi Kastiel, Elements of an Effective Whistleblower Hotline, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 25, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/10/25/elements-of-an-
effective-whistleblower-hotline.
77. The OECD defines local content requirements as “policies imposed by governments that
require firms to use domestically-manufactured goods or domestically-supplied services in order
to operate in an economy.” Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Local Content Requirements
Impact the Global Economy, https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/local-content-requirements (last
visited July 29, 2020).
78. Id. (“There has been a substantial increase in the use of these measures in recent years, as
governments try to achieve a variety of policy objectives that target employment, industrial, and
technological development goals.”); see also Hanna Deringer et al., The Economic Impact of Lo-
cal Content Requirements: A Case Study of Heavy Vehicles, EUR. CTR. FOR INT’L POL. ECON.
(Jan. 2018), https://ecipe.org/publications/the-economic-impact-of-local-content-requirements
(noting that countries with significant activity in LCRs are Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indo-
nesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States and arguing that “[b]y imposing LCRs govern-
ments might try to promote general political goals like maintaining or improving the domestic
employment, attracting FDI and companies from high-value added and R&D intense industries,
and increasing the access to foreign technology”).
79. See Babafemi Oyewole (Consultant), Overview of Local Content Regulatory Frameworks
in Selected ECCAS Countries, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/COM/INF/2018/4 (May 2018) (analyz-
ing the use of local content policies as a development strategy aimed at increasing the benefits
from the oil and gas and mining sector, and examining the local content frameworks of Angola,
Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon).
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contribute to the local economy without finding themselves in improper
business partnerships.
Finally, as part of oversight and monitoring activities, investors should
implement a mechanism to promptly review and resolve claims related to
overcharges or improper invoicing. Should the state-owned entity or public
actor come under scrutiny, these claims will raise concerns and attract me-
dia attention that could implicate the investor.
Once tied to a contractual agreement with a public or state-owned en-
tity, corruption scandals affecting a counterparty will affect the value of a
company’s investment and could create long-term reputational damage.
Corporate actors can and should take concrete steps to mitigate risks when
they build a compliance program. Taking these steps—if coupled with addi-
tional assurances from enforcement agencies that these steps will in fact
shield investors from legal liability or enforcement action—will also serve
to encourage foreign investment in emerging markets, where this invest-
ment is most needed.
While an effective compliance program is key to preventing violations
of corruption laws and promptly addressing allegations of misconduct, it
cannot fully eliminate risk. Poor conflict management could influence a
company’s long-term investment prospects in the host country. Companies
should also develop strategies for responding to disputes with the host
country in the aftermath of a corruption scandal or in the context of an
anticorruption sweep.
B. The Need for Investors to Develop Greater Understanding of the
Various Government Institutions That Could Be Involved in a
Corruption-Related Dispute or Enforcement Action
After allegations of bribery or corruption arise in the media, a variety
of state actors may be involved in reviewing an investor’s work or investi-
gating the agency or state-owned entity about which allegations have arisen.
Understanding the functions of these players will inform an investor’s strat-
egy and response. Notably, once investors obtain an accurate understanding
of the source and motivations behind a set of allegations, they can deter-
mine the extent to which they should cooperate, explore options for exiting
the investment, commence legal proceedings against the host state, or con-
sider other options to address the conflict. A media strategy to minimize
potential public-relations risk can also be developed.
One key action is to determine the authority of the state actor and the
enforcement tools at its disposal (i.e., whether it can issue subpoenas, order
damages, and seize property, or whether it merely conducts hearings and
issues findings and recommendations). In South Africa, for instance, the
Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corrup-
tion, and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of the State (“State
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Capture Commission”) has reviewed dealings involving a number of state-
owned entities, such as the national airline, the railway agency, and the
utility companies.80 In the course of these investigations, the commission
has sought testimony from a number of private entities that did business
with these state-owned entities. However, actively engaging in and cooper-
ating with commission proceedings does not mean that a company will
avoid a subsequent investigation by the Directorate for Priority Crime In-
vestigation, the arm of the South African police service responsible for in-
vestigating serious corruption.81 Commissions of inquiry are established by
the president of South Africa to seek out facts and make nonbinding recom-
mendations to the president. They do not make binding decisions but can
bring detrimental consequences on foreign investors.82
Investors should also understand whether information and documenta-
tion shared in the course of an investigation will be made public. The State
Capture Commission, for instance, issues media notices informing the pub-
lic of upcoming hearings. The press has access to the hearings, and videos
and transcripts are publicly available.83 This means that documents and in-
formation that may include trade secrets or information about revenues can
become widely known once shared with the State Capture Commission and
similar bodies.
Anticorruption commissions and tribunals may not always be fair arbi-
ters of justice. These bodies may be politically motivated, and host-country
leaders may use the bodies to neutralize the opposition, obtain legitimacy
by distancing themselves from corrupt officials in prior administrations, or
blame foreign investors for what may primarily (although not exclusively)
be internally driven corruption challenges. The public hearings can devolve
into spectacles designed to score political points and satiate civil society’s
desire to hold parties publicly accountable.
In Cameroon, for instance, following pressure by international finan-
cial backers, the government launched “the Epervier Operation” to address
the rampant corruption in the country.84 Starting in 2006, the anticorruption
drive has led to the arrests of senior civil servants and former ministers.
However, the criteria for pursuing investigations is unclear, legal proceed-
ings lack transparency, and commentators have argued that the anticorrup-
80. Terms of Reference of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Cap-
ture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of the State, GN 3 of GG 41403
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://sastatecapture.org.za/uploads/Terms_Of_Reference.pdf.
81. The South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008 §§ 17B, 17D.
82. The State Capture Commission, like all other commissions of inquiry in South Africa, is
a statutory creation and was appointed by former President Jacob Zuma under section 84(2)(f) of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. S. AFR. CONST. § 84(2)(f), 1996.
83. See Media Statements, COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO STATE CAPTURE, https://sastatecap-
ture.org.za/site/media/statements (last visited July 28, 2020).
84. INT’L CRISIS GRP., CAMEROON: THE DANGERS OF A FRACTURING REGIME, AFRICA RE-
PORT N°161 (June 24, 2020), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4c2848b62.pdf.
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tion enforcement mechanism has been used as a political tool to jail
influential politicians perceived as threats to the regime.85
Thus, an investor’s strategy in responding to a public inquiry or poten-
tial enforcement action must be informed by an assessment of whether the
process will be fair or politically motivated. Even ethical investors with
robust compliance programs in place must carefully navigate the risks of
disclosure and engagement with host state regulatory authorities. Where en-
forcement of corruption laws is arbitrary, that represents a challenge for
investors and constitutes another significant factor in determining whether
to invest. Commissions and proceedings should be organized to best protect
the rule of law and not be allowed to be used for political means, which
ultimately stymies economic development by discouraging foreign inves-
tors.86 Uncertainty regarding how disputes in the wake of a corruption scan-
dal would be handled—particularly where the consequences could be
global (for example, home-country prosecutions and global reputational
damage)—poses a serious threat to investors.
The private investor should also understand whether its state-actor
counterpart is in a position to understand the technical aspects of any pro-
ject. A public department conducting an internal review of its procurement
or other contracting decisions may be able to determine with ease whether
the technical requirements of a project warranted issuing a request for pro-
posal to only a few private entities or even a single entity. In contrast, in an
investigation by a prosecutor or politically appointed commission, the in-
vestor may need to spend time and resources explaining the technical as-
pects of a project to demonstrate that the selection process, and the ultimate
execution of the project, were not tainted by misconduct.
In addition, investors seeking to make high returns on projects or in-
vestments involving governments and state-owned entities in emerging
markets should be prepared to defend those profits, which can be viewed
through the lens of corruption scandals as exploitative windfalls obtained at
the expense of the host country.
Even after conducting a careful evaluation of the state actors investi-
gating or reviewing the investor’s activities, an investor can get caught up
in actions by the host country that are unfair or politically motivated. Ad-
vance consideration of an exit strategy is important.
85. Id. at 6 (“With the ongoing Epervier operation, the president kills several birds with one
stone: he rebuilds political legitimacy in the fight against corruption by dismissing those of dubi-
ous character, and reinforces his power via the elimination of those considered too ambitious. He
could also be clearing the way for a potential successor.”).
86. Demas, supra note 6, at 340–44.
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C. The Need for Investors to Have an Exit Option
An investor in emerging markets should never be caught without the
ability to exit, or without the ability to repatriate its funds, people, and prod-
uct. Such safeguards protect investors both financially and legally, as
nonrepatriated assets are subject to seizure or attachment in lawsuits or
other dispute proceedings.
Public corruption scandals, when played out but unresolved, are likely
to alter and possibly completely freeze a company’s business projects or
operations with a public agent or state-owned entity. If the company’s rela-
tionship with its public or state-owned counterparty becomes adversarial, it
may have no choice but to seek compensation and resolution of the dispute
through the fora of investor-state dispute settlement. Investor-state arbitra-
tion can be costly and unpredictable and can damage the long-term invest-
ment prospects of a foreign company in the host country.87 As a result,
some scholars and practitioners see more value in interest-based dispute-
resolution processes, such as mediation (or conciliation), which is a party-
driven negotiation that may be more likely to preserve the parties’ rela-
tions—a crucial consideration when an international investor has illiquid or
nonremovable capital in the host country.88
Nevertheless, in the context of large-scale public corruption scandals
(for example, those in Brazil and South Africa), it can be challenging to
fully resolve investor-state disputes through these interest-based processes.
Political considerations, coupled with the demands of civil society and the
power of social media to drive narratives, often require public commissions
and at times what seem like inquisitorial proceedings, which can turn into
primarily political processes that make it challenging (if not impossible) to
achieve true interest-based resolution.89
Ideally, the investor and the state can limit their conflict to a purely
contractual dispute and explore contractual remedies, including damages
payment. However, while payment of damages helps achieve reconciliation
in traditional interest-based dispute resolution, in social media–driven scan-
dals, such steps can be counterproductive—viewed as admissions of guilt—
87. See, e.g., Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2543, 2548 (June 20,
2014); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Mediators in Arbitration, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L ARB.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3467670; see also Daniel Wein-
stein & Mushegh Manukyan, Making Mediation More Attractive for Investor-State Disputes,
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/03/26/
making-mediation-more-attractive-for-investor-state-disputes.
88. See Weinstein & Munukyan, supra note 87.
89. Client confidential matters. See also James M. Claxton, Compelling Parties to Mediate
Investor-State Disputes: No Pressure, No Diamonds?, 20 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 78, 85 (Apr. 4,
2020) (summarizing report that found “states are more reluctant to settle disputes than investors
and that the main reason for their reluctance is a preference to defer responsibility for deciding
disputes to third-party adjudicators. Underlying this concern is fear of allegations or prosecution
for corruption, fear of public criticism, and fear of setting a settlement precedent that might en-
courage other investors to make claims”).
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and can result in only more calls for criminal prosecution or other corporate
or individual liability for the investor.90 In the context of some social me-
dia–driven corruption scandals, no good deed of the investor seeking to
respond transparently and conciliatorily goes unpunished.
D. The Need for Investors to Consider the Impact of Corruption
Scandals and Associated Disputes with Host Countries on
Potential Enforcement Actions in Other Jurisdictions
Corruption scandals in a host country can lead to civil or criminal cor-
ruption enforcement against investors in a number of other jurisdictions be-
cause of the broad jurisdictional reach of anticorruption laws like the FCPA
and the UK Bribery Act, as well as the increasing cooperation among regu-
lators around the world.91 Considering the impact of these growing scandals
on an investor’s liability around the world is crucial.
The most important step for ethical companies and investors caught up
in a corruption scandal is to identify the scope of any violations and remedi-
ate them promptly and thoroughly. Under most extraterritorial bribery stat-
utes—including the FCPA—disclosure of violations to regulators is not
legally required, and failure to do so voluntarily in the absence of a legal
requirement is not considered unethical or inappropriate (as long as poten-
tial violations are identified and fully remedied). However, voluntary dis-
closure of violations remains an option, and reporting of corruption
allegations and the widespread dissemination of such allegations through
social media affect an investor’s voluntary disclosure calculus. Voluntary
self-disclosure of potential violations of antibribery and anticorruption laws,
cooperation, and timely remediation may allow companies to receive coop-
eration credit and reduce their risk of criminal prosecution in their home
countries or other active enforcement states. In the United States, the DOJ’s
“Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,” “FCPA Cor-
porate Enforcement Policy,” and Resource Guide to the U.S. FCPA deline-
ate the requirements that a company must meet to earn credit for self-
disclosure of potential FCPA violations.92 Similarly, in the United King-
dom, the Corporate Co-operation Guidance, released in August 2019, pro-
90. Client confidential matters.
91. Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Resolving Foreign Bribery with Non-Trial Reso-
lutions: Settlements and Non-Trial Agreements by Parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention (2019),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Resolving-foreign-bribery-cases-with-non-trial-resolu-
tions.pdf; Agustin Flah et al., World Bank, Left out of the Bargain: Settlements in Foreign Bribery
Cases and Implications for Asset Recovery (2014), https://star.worldbank.org/sites/star/files/978
1464800863.pdf; ALL. FOR INTEGRITY, COMPLIANCE BULLETIN 1: THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL
REACH OF US, UK AND GERMAN ANTI-BRIBERY LAW, https://www.allianceforintegrity.org/wAs-
sets/docs/publications/Compliance-Bulletin/AfIn_ComplianceBulletin_01.pdf.
92. Full cooperation with U.S. authorities can, among other benefits, create a presumption of
criminal declination (absent aggravating circumstances) and a reduction of up to 50 percent of the
low end of the fine range of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note
72, at 52; U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-47.120 (2019).
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vides a roadmap for companies seeking cooperation credit from the Serious
Fraud Office, consistent with its Guidance on Corporate Prosecutions.
To receive credit for voluntarily self-disclosing evidence of miscon-
duct, companies must come forward early, i.e., soon after becoming aware
of a potential bribery or corruption violation. Under the US “FCPA Corpo-
rate Enforcement Policy,” voluntary disclosure must occur “prior to an im-
minent threat of disclosure or government investigation.”93 Similarly, the
UK Corporate Co-operation Guidance requires companies to self-report
“within a reasonable time of the suspicions coming to light.”94
Investigative journalism and anticorruption advocacy campaigns can
significantly increase regulators’ likelihood of independently detecting is-
sues in both an investor’s home and host country. The media, particularly
social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, can relay findings of
anticorruption investigations led by journalists or civil society almost in-
stantly.95 Once incriminating information appears in the public domain—
even where that information may not be fully accurate or complete—com-
panies must react quickly as the time window for voluntary self-disclosure
(and its associated benefits) vanishes rapidly. Further, social media’s global
publicizing of corruption scandals often requires investors to take a consis-
tent global approach to voluntary disclosure and the amount of information
it discloses to regulators, which complicates investors’ risk calculation
given the differences across jurisdictions between enforcement agencies,
cooperation benefits, and disclosure ramifications.
Investigative journalism and the media are therefore growing exoge-
nous forces that can compel companies to look into allegations of miscon-
duct promptly and hasten companies’ engagement with regulators around
the world. Companies considering voluntary disclosure to authorities there-
fore must weigh various factors, including but not limited to the likelihood
that regulators will independently discover the information, the likelihood
of prosecution, the risk of civil litigation, the number of jurisdictions at
93. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual, supra note 92 (referring to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018)).
94. Corporate Co-operation Guidance, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE 1 (Aug. 2019), https://
www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-protocols/sfo-operational-handbook/corporate-
co-operation-guidance.
95. See Chandan Kumar Jha & Sudipta Sarangi, Social Media, Internet, and Corruption,
39 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y, 2, 21 (2016) (“Social media can affect corruption not only by facilitating
the transmission of user-generated information, but also by facilitating the sharing of, and thereby
enabling corruption related news coming from a free press to reach a larger audience.”); U.N.
Convention Against Corruption, Reporting on Corruption: A Research Tool for Governments and
Journalists, 3 (Jan. 2014), http://www.unodc.org/documents/congress/background-information/
Corruption/Resource_Tool_for_Governments_and_Journalists.pdf (“Investigative reports shared
through Twitter, Facebook and other social media are used to galvanize the public in protest
against blatant corruption.”).
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play, and the impact of a voluntary disclosure on the company’s business,
executives, liabilities, and reputation.96
In highly politicized regulatory environments pressured by civil soci-
ety anticorruption movements, it can also be difficult to ensure that infor-
mation disclosed to regulators will remain confidential and not appear in the
media or other public forums—resulting in negative collateral conse-
quences for the investor. Information shared in one jurisdiction should not
contradict information shared in another, and an investor should approach
any ostensibly confidential proceeding with caution and view guarantees of
confidentiality with a healthy skepticism.
An investor should ensure that other jurisdictions consider any corrup-
tion-related investigation that the investor’s host country conducted and any
related penalties or damages already paid in the host country. As the Euro-
pean Union and the United States increase extraterritorial enforcement of
their anticorruption laws in emerging markets, companies should leverage
investigations conducted by host countries to limit liability in their home
countries. With increased information sharing through cross-border cooper-
ation by enforcement authorities, internet resources, and social media net-
works, it is increasingly challenging for investors to handle corruption
scandals regionally or on a piecemeal basis. A global strategy is critical
when managing today’s globalized corruption scandals and associated
disputes.97
CONCLUSION
Investigative journalism and anticorruption campaigns leveraging so-
cial media and new TICs have shed light on large-scale corruption scandals,
shaping both foreign investors’ cost-benefit analysis when investing in
emerging markets and regulators’ priorities when enforcing antibribery and
anticorruption laws in both home and host countries.
96. Self-reporting is not a guarantee of nonprosecution. It may, for example, expose execu-
tives and senior employees to individual prosecutions, it does not shield a company from civil
charges, it can erode the company’s attorney-client privilege, and it can prompt authorities to
scrutinize the companies’ business operations beyond the scope of the information it voluntarily
disclosed.
97. For instance, companies should ensure that a settlement in one jurisdiction is informed by
settlements made in another. Negotiating global settlements has become increasingly common in
anticorruption enforcement. As noted above, in 2020, Airbus settled charges that it had violated
anticorruption laws of France, the U.K., and the U.S. and entered into a global settlement of
approximately $4 billion. See Press Release, supra note 55. Following Operation Car Wash in
Brazil, a number of companies and individuals resolved corruption allegations with Brazilian au-
thorities as well as authorities in other jurisdictions. In 2016, Odebrecht/Braskem entered into a
global settlement of approximately US$3.5 billion with authorities in Brazil, Switzerland, and the
U.S. See Press Release, supra note 56. Similarly, in 2018, Petroleo Brasilerio resolved corruption
charges with both U.S. and Brazil authorities. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Petróleo
Brasileiro S.A. – Petrobras Agrees to Pay More Than $850 Million for FCPA Violations (Sept.
27, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/petr-leo-brasileiro-sa-petrobras-agrees-pay-more-850-
million-fcpa-violations.
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Foreign investors doing (or contemplating) business with public or
state-owned entities in emerging markets should strategically consider how
these new trends may affect the stability of their investment and long-term
relations with the host country. Investors should take into account past, cur-
rent, and potential future anticorruption investigations led by journalists and
civil society as significant data points when measuring potential bribery and
corruption risk in emerging markets, where regulators have historically
been less prone to sanction the demand side of bribery and corruption.
As experiences in various emerging markets have demonstrated, large-
scale public corruption scandals widely driven and disseminated by journal-
ists and social media can taint foreign investors’ reputations and threaten
the future of ongoing business relationships with public or state-owned enti-
ties—even in circumstances where an investor has committed no wrong. To
limit the risk of negative corruption-related media attention and related en-
forcement or disputes, investors should go into a host country with an effec-
tive compliance program designed to tackle corruption risk associated with
the country, industry, and anticipated transactions. Further, should a dispute
arise with the host state, investors should adopt a strategic approach to en-
gaging with domestic enforcement mechanisms, one that considers global
implications and appropriate remediation measures.
